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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; DJ. BARNEY, an · 
individual; WILLIAM DAVIS, an individual; 
LOIS DA VIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. · 




Case No. CV 10-680 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PAL I 
Plaintiff KeyBank National Association ("KeyBank" or "Plaintiff'), by through its 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, submits Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Partial PAL I as to Count Title and Declaratory Judgment) and 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
PAGE 1 
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Count 3 (Creditor's Bill) of its Complaint for Quiet Title or Alternatively for Creditor's Bill (the 
"Complaint"). Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Counts 1 and 3 
because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff is a secured creditor with priority 
over PAL I, LLC ("PAL I"). 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 
On or about April 16, 2007, KeyBank loaned Tri-Steel Construction Company, Inc. 
("Tri-Steel") $150,000 (the "2007 Loan"). On or about December 5, 2008, KeyBank loaned 
Tri-Steel an additional $150,000 (the "2008 Loan"). As security for the 2007 and 2008 Loans, 
Tri-Steel executed certain commercial security agreements, which pledged certain property 
owned by Tri-Steel as collateral. · On April 23, 2007, KeyBank filed a UCC Financing 
Statement with the Idaho Secretary of State perfecting its interest in the 2007 collateral. 
Likewise, on February 23, 2010, Key Bank filed a UCC Financing Statement with the Idaho 
Secretary of State perfecting its interest in the 2008 collateral. 
Key Bank brought suit against Tri-Steel in District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho in and for the County of Madison, as Case No. CV-10-191 (the "Original 
Lawsuit") for breach of the 2007 and 2008 Loans. 
In April, 2010, Key Bank learned that Defendant PAL I had caused the Madison County 
Sheriff to serve a writ execution and notice of attachment against certain property belonging to 
Tri-Steel. On April 28, 2010, Key Bank's counsel sent PAL I's counsel a letter stating that the 
property PAL I sought to seize was KeyBank's secured collateral (the "KeyBank Collateral"). 
informed P/U, I that it had no right to or KcyBank Collateral, that if 
any sale of property occurred, KcyBank would rights it had in the KeyBank 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I which i11clucics lhc focts set fi.11·th below. 
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Collateral, including a right to the proceeds from the sale. 
The Original Lawsuit was reduced to a default judgment on June 1, 2010, in the amount 
of $296,500.10 plus interest and attorneys' fees (the "Judgment"). The Judgment also provided 
that Key Bank was entitled to a writ of possession against Tri-Steel directing the Sheriff to put 
Key Bank in possession of the KeyBank Collateral and authorizing Key Bank, upon its receipt of 
said collateral, to utilize its non~udicial remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
On or about June 4, 2010, Key Bank sent the Madison County Sheriffs Office a writ of 
execution for the Key Bank Collateral and instructed the Sheriff to seize the Key Bank Collateral. 
KeyBank also requested orally and in writing that the Sheriff's Office and PAL I postpone the 
sale scheduled for June 9, 2010 or hold all sale proceeds in a trust account for KeyBank. Despite 
KeyBank's objections, the sale proceeded as scheduled. 2 According to an accounting provided 
by the Sheriff's Office, $16,884.41 was disbursed to PAL I (the "Sale Proceeds"). As a secured 
creditor with priority over PAL I, a mere judgment creditor, KeyBank's right in the Sale 
Proceeds is superior to PAL I. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a rnatler of law.'" Gibson v. Ada Coun(y, 
142 Idaho 746, 752, 133 P.Jd 1211, 1217 (2006) (citing Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungesrer & 
Lezamiz, 134 Jdaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000)). See also IRCP Rule 56(c). A party 
a motion for summary judgment must sel 1S a 
"genuine issue" about a "material " Turtle v. Sudcna l11d11s., , 125 Idaho 145, i50, 868 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
ic:: lo: P:utial Pal I, r1t 
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P.2d 473, 478 (1994); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 
1992). Indeed, a "nonmoving pa1iy must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an 
issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. A mere scintilla of evidence or 
only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the 
purposes of summary judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 
(2007) (citing Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238,108 P.3d 380,385 (2005)). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. KeyBank is Entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law on Counts 1 
and 3 of the Complaint Because there is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
that Plaintiff is a Secured Creditor that has Priority Over PAL I. 
Key Bank has a secured interest in the KeyBank Collateral and Sale Proceeds that is prior 
to PAL I. It would therefore be inequitable to interpret Idaho Code § 11-203 as negating 
Plaintiffs priority simply because KeyBank did not file a claim of exemption related to the sale 
of Tri-Steel's property on June 9, 20 l O at the direction of PAL I. 
Idaho Code § 11-203 states that within 14 days of receiving notice that his property has 
been levied upon by another creditor, the third party "shall prepare a written claim setting forth 
the grounds upon which he claims the properly ... and the dollar amount of the claim." Under 
Idaho Code § 8-527, this same rule applies to a third party who has an interest in personal 
property that has been attached, garnished or executed upon. 
The California code has a similar third paity claim procedure for levied or attached 
property, but it expressly states "The interest of the third person in the prope1ty levied upon is 
not by the third s failure to file a claim this " CCP 
§§ 720. 1 and 720.250. In explaining why the third party claim procedures are Qj)Jiomil, 
California case states: 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTI.L\L SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
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' 
the third-party does not waive a superior interest in the 
property levied upon by failure to make such a third-party 
claim .... This principle is a corollary of the general rule a 
judgment or levy reaches only the interest of the debtor in 
the prope1ty because a judgment creditor can acquire no 
greater right in the property levied upon that than that of its 
judgment debtor. 
Regency Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lanes, Inc., 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 552, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995). 
This same principle should apply under Idaho law, making the claim of exemption 
procedures under Idaho Code § 11-203 optional and not mandatory.3 It is settled law that the 
"creditor holding a perfected security interest has priority over a subsequent execution on a 
judgment" and only "property owned by the judgment debtor is subject to execution to satisfy a 
judgment. The levy reaches only the interest of the debtor in the property, and a judgment 
creditor can acquire no greater right in the property than that which the judgment debtor 
possesses .... A party seeking to enforce a judgment stands in the shoes of the judgment debtor 
in relation to any debt owed the debtor or a property interest the debtor may own; thus, to the 
extent the debtor has no interest, the creditor's interest extends no further." Am. Jur. 2d SeCL\red 
~ Transactions§ 837; Am. Jur. 2d Executions§ 120. 
Li.. 
It would therefore contradict settled law and public policy to strictly read Idaho Code § 
11-203 as a mandatory provision that allows a judgment creditor, who can only reach such 
interest in property that is retained by the debtor, to trump a secured creditor if the secured 
creditor does not file a claim of exemption for the property. 
3 While no Idaho case law directly analy1:cs lhe effect of fai to file a written claim of exemption, in 
S!ay1on v Zapp, 108 Idaho 244, 245 ( 1985), the Idaho Court of discusses these code sections and 
states (emphasis added): "Section 8-527 a third party to asscrl a claim to personal property which is 
lo a writ of' alt::1chrn1o11t. Th1o slc1tuk, by the same rules 
claims to supporl thJ, '.he written claim 
Idaho Cock§ 11-203 a:·e 
F 
11)005;0 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiffs claims against PAL I are based on the priority of its security interest 
in the Key Bank Collateral, and because Plaintiff's failure to file a claim of exemption did not 
alter that secured interest as a matter of law, the Court should grant Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Against PAL I. 
DATED this 4th day of October, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
Amber N. Dina 
Attorneys for KeyBank National Association 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith D 
B.J. Driscoll D 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC D 
414 Shoup A vc. )(J_ 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar JD/I 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (JD State Bar ID# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I -2720 
Telephone: 208-3 88- 1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
980804 _ _1 
Attorneys for Key Bank National Association 
OCT -5 20!0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOIS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARt"'\JEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 10-680 
AFFIDAVIT OF AMBER N. DINA 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PALI 
I, AMBER N. DINA, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit, 
if called to testi would and could 
1. arn over age 1 (I ;0 
testify thereto: 
associate: in the !av.· 
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2. The law firm of Givens Pursley LLP, Thomas Dvorak and I are legal counsel for 
Key Bank National Association ( collectively "Key Bank"), in the above-titled action. 
3. As set forth in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint for Quiet Title or Alternatively for 
Creditor's Bill (the "Complaint"), Thomas Dvorak sent a letter to PAL l's counsel on April 28, 
2010. 
4. As set forth in Paragraphs 27 through 33 of the Complaint, I participated in 
several phone calls with the Madison County Sheriffs Office and its counsel, sent letters to the 
Sheriffs Office and sent letters to counsel for PAL I in attempt to postpone the sale of 
Key Bank's Collateral scheduled for June 9, 2010 or to have all sale proceeds held in a trust 
account for KeyBank. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho and the United 
States that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Amber N. Dina 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of October, 2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF AMBER N DINA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of October, 2010, a true and conect copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
AFFIDAVIT OF AMBER N DINA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (JD State Bar ID# 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (ID State Bar JD# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-38 8-1200 
Facsimile: 208-3 88-1300 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT.FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an . 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 1 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOIS DA VIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV 10-680 
AFflDA VIT OF JEFF HART 
I, HART, being first duly sworn upon oath, states and deposes as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF HART 
PAGE 11 
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704672!404 Keybank Home lmprove1n 05:34:17 p.m. 10-04-2010 
2. I am a Vice President of Business Banking for Plaintiff KeyBank National 
Association, and I am an authorized representative for Plaintiff. 
3. I have read the contents of the Complaint for Quiet Title or Alternatively for 
Creditor's Bill filed in the above-entitled action (the "Complaint"). 
4. I know the contents of the Complaint and believe the same to be true. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho and the United 
States that the foregoing is true and cotTect. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_±_ day of October, 2010. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FpR IDAHO 
Residing at v.iJJ)(; -~daho 
Commission Expires: S-/.S ·c?'0/3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B .J. Drisco 11 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar JD# 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (JD State Bar ID# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
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Attorneys for KeyBank National Association 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; DJ. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DAVIS, an individual; 
LOIS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-680 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
PAL I, LLC'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiff KeyBank National Association ("KeyBank" or "Plaintiff'), through its 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, submits this Opposition to P I, s I") 
in Opposition to 
ldi002/ 
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1 
has also filed its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against PAL I, which is set for 
hearing at the same time as KeyBank's motion. Because both motions for summary judgment 
involve the same basic issues, KeyBank opposes PAL I's motion for all the reasons set fo1ih in 
Key Bank's memorandum in support of its motion, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
As set forth below, PAL I asserts Idaho Code § 11-203 is a mandatory provision that 
allows an unsecured judgment creditor to defeat a secured creditor's priority if the secured 
creditor does not file a third party claim. PAL I bases this argument on its assertion that because 
a debtor may waive its claim of exemptions, which are also addressed in Idaho Code § 11-203, a 
secured creditor may likewise "waive" its secured interest in a debtor's properly. Idaho law 
does not support such a "waiver" by a secured creditor who has a vested property right in its 
secured collateral. Further, the absence of any express consequence for a secured creditor who 
does not file a third party claim demonstrates the Idaho Legislature did not intend Idaho Code § 
11-203 to be mandatory or affect a secured creditor's vested property rights. Therefore, whether 
or not KeyBank filed a third party claim under Idaho Code§ 11-203 docs not alter its secured 
interest as a matter of law. 
H. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On or about April 16, 2007, KeyBank loaned Tri-Steel Construction Company, Inc. 
("Tri-Steel") $150,000 (the "2007 Loan"). On or about December 5, 2008, KcyBank loaned 
Tri-Steel a11 additional $150,000 (the "2008 Loan"). As security for the 2007 and 2008 Loans, 
Tri-Steel executed certain commercial security agreements, which pledged certain property 
owned by Tri-Steel as collateral. On April 23, 2007, KeyBank a UCC Financing 
2J, 20 l 0, Key Bank filed a UCC 
ils int,cre.sl col 12 - ') 
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Exhibits A - D; see also Second Affidavit of Jeff Hart ("Hart Aff."). 
KeyBank brought suit against Tri-Steel in District Comi of the Seventh Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho in and for the County of Madison, as Case No. CV-I 0-191 (the "Original 
Lawsuit") for breach of the 2007 and 2008 Loans. See Complaint, at ir 20; see also Second 
Affidavit of Amber N. Dina ("Dina Second Aff."), at~ 3. 
In April, 2010, Key Bank learned that Defendant PAL I had caused the Madison County 
Sheriff to serve a writ of execution and notice of attachment against certain property belonging 
to Tri-Steel. On April 28, 2010, KeyBank's counsel sent PAL I's counsel a letter stating that 
the property PAL I sought to seize was KeyBank's secured collateral (the "KeyBank 
Collateral"). KeyBank informed PAL I that it had no right to seize or sell the KcyBank 
Collateral, and that if any sale of such property occurred, Key Bank would retain all rights it had 
in the KeyBank Collateral, including a right to the proceeds from the sale. See Affidavit of 
Amber N. Dina in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Pal I ("Dina 
Aff."), filed on October 4, 2010, at il 3. 
The Original Lawsuit was reduced to a default judgment on June 1, 2010, in the amount 
of $296,500.10 plus interest and attorneys' fees (the "Judgment"). The Judgment also provided 
that Key Bank was entitled to a writ of possession against Tri-Steel directing the Sheriff to put 
Key Bank in possession of the Key Bank Collateral and authorizing Key Bank, upon its receipt of 
said collateral, to utilize its non-judicial remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code. See 
Comp:aint, at 24 and Exhibit F; see also Second Dina Aff. at 1! 3 . 
On or about June 4, 10, KcyBank sent the Madison County Office a 
execution for Key Bank Collateral and instructed the Sheriff to Collateral. 
KcyBank requested and in s Office I poslponc 
F{} 
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sale scheduled for June 9, 2010 or hold all sale proceeds in a trust account for KeyBank. 
Despite KeyBank's objections, the sale proceeded as scheduled. See Dina Aff. at ~ 4. 
According to an accounting provided by the Sheriffs Office, $16,884.41 was disbursed to PAL 
I (the "Sale Proceeds"). See Second Dina Aff. at ii 3. As a secured creditor with priority over 
PAL I, a mere judgment lien creditor, KeyBank's right in the KeyBank Collateral and Sale 
Proceeds is superior to PAL I. 
HI. DISCUSSION REGARDING MOTION TO STRIKE 
Defendant PAL I has filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Jeff Hart submitted by 
Plaintiff Key Bank on October 4, 2010. The gist of the Motion seems to be that Mr. Hart does 
not invoke magic words of "personal knowledge" but instead states that he makes his affidavit 
based upon information and belief. First, KeyBank has resolved this issue by submitting a 
Second Affidavit of Jeff Hart, filed contemporaneously herewith, which contains the requisite 
statement that the affidavit is made upon his personal knowledge. Second, the key factual 
provisions that are at isslle, i.e., specifically what happened with respect to the timing of the 
atteh1pted execution of the judgment by Key Bank and the execution of the PAL I judgment are 
effectively in the record and set forth in the affidavits of respective counsel or otherwise 
submitted in the case. The affidavit of Mr. Hart docs, in large part, provide background 
information that, while perhaps material, is not as critically material to the resolution of the 
pending summary judgment motions as said other information. Finally, based on Mr. Hart's 
original affidavit, it would appear that he has a sufficient basis to have personal knowledge of 
the set faith in his affidavit as he was the bank officer who was intricately invol i 11 the 
underlying loans at issue that Jed to the · whicb is enforced. this 
Court has and Cil'.JSe to deny Motion to consider 
st~1ten1c,nts sc,1 [\VO 
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IV. DISCUSSION REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. While a Debtor May Waive a Claim of Exemption, a Secured Creditor Has a 
Vested Property Right that Cannot be Waived. 
PAL I does not dispute that KeyBank has a validly perfected security interest in the 
Key Bank Collateral and Sale Proceeds; however, PAL I asserts Key Bank waived its first 
position priority by failing to file a third party claim under Idaho Code§ 11-203. An exemption 
that may be expressly waived by a debtor under statutory law is not equivalent to a secured 
creditor's vested property interest, and therefore case law related to a debtor's waiver of 
exemptions arc inapposite to this litigation. 
Idaho Code § 11-203 states that within 14 days of receiving notice that his prope1ty has 
been levied upon by another creditor, the third party "shall prepare a written claim setting forth 
the grounds upon which he claims the property ... and the dollar amount of the claim." The 
same Code Section also requires a defendant whose property is levied to complete a claim of 
exemption form in the same time frame. 
An exemption is defined as a "privilege given to a judgment debtor by law, allowing the 
debtor to retain certain property without liability." Black's Law Dictionary 593 (7th ed .. 1999). 
"Exemption laws are intended to ameliorate the harsh common-law rule making all of a debtor's 
property liable to execution for the payment of his debts by protecting specified property from 
forced sale." 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions § 3 (2002). 1 "Exemption statutes arc not designed to 
benefit or protect creditors", rather "exemption rights are personal to the debtor, and may be 
" 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions § I, 4 (2002). 
: r:·01 example, Jclaiio Code § 11-603 that ctn individu:11 debtor is c:1titlccl lo an for of 
household cloth and an for one n:otnr 
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PAL I cites several cases in support of its argument that "the right to claim property as 
exempt is a right that may be waived." See PAL I's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("PAL I's Brief'), at 4. These cases, however, are all in the context of a debtor, not a 
creditor, waiving exemptions. For example, in State v. Goering, 392 P.2d 930 (Kan. 1964), a 
judgment creditor requested the sheriff's office levy an execution on the debtor's property, which 
included several vehicles.· The court held the debtor waived a claim of exemption for his pickup 
truck when he expressly told the levying officers that they could take the truck. 
In contrast to exemption rights which may be waived by the debtor, by virtue of its 
perfected security interest, KeyBank has a vested property right in the KeyBank Collateral and 
Sale Proceeds. A secured creditor is a party "who has the right, on the debtor's default, to 
proceed against collateral and apply to it payment of the debt." Black's Law Dictionary 376 
(7th ed. 1999). A secured creditor's priority in specific property becomes secured on the date its 
security interest is perfected. I.C. § 28-9-203. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security 
interest is only subordinate to the rights of a judgment lien creditor (like PAL I) that becomes a 
judgment lien creditor before the security interest is perfected. LC. § 28-9-3 J 7(a)(A); see also 
lvfellor v. Pistole, 734 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (A "judgment lien creditor is not a bona 
fide purchaser, and therefore is subject to all prior interests in the property, whether known or 
unknown, recorded or unrecorded."). 
The same legal principles apply to a debtor in bankruptcy--a debtor can waive 
exemptions, but a secured creditor has a property right. A debtor must file c1 claim of 
witli court, lure to do so in loss the 
Rule 4003 of Rules of Procedure; see also l I TJ.S (' ' ':? In 
of the bankrnpt who their interest do not to 
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file a proof of claim. The pre-bankruptcy lien is sufficient to have a claim in the bankruptcy 
court proceeding. See In re Brawders, 503 F.3d 856, 872 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Unsecured claims 
invariably are affected by bankruptcy. In contrast, as we have noted, in rem rights generally pass 
through bankruptcy unaffected. Therefore, unlike unsecured creditors, secured creditors may 
ignore the bankruptcy proceedings and look to the lien for satisfaction of the debt."). 
In this case, on April 23, 2007, KeyBank perfected its security interest in the 2007 
collateral by filing a UCC Financing Statement with the Idaho Secretary of State. Likewise, on 
February 23, 2008, KeyBank filed a UCC Financing Statement perfecting its interest in the 2008 
collateral. On April 2, 2010, after Key Bank had perfected its security interest in all of the 
KeyBank Collateral, PAL I received a Default Judgment against Tri-Steel and proceeded to 
obtain a writ of execution against the KeyBank Collateral.2 Therefore, under Idaho law, 
KeyBank has first priority vested property right in the KeyBank Collateral. 
PAL I asserts that KeyBank waived its vested right in the KcyBank Collateral by failing 
to file a third party claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-203. As explained above, "waiver" of an 
exemption only applied to debtors. It would also be illogical to hold that KeyBank somehow 
"waived" its vested right when it was actively seeking to levy the KeyBank Collateral prior to 
the June 9, 2010 sale and had notified PAL I of the same. Further, PAL I's argument 
contradicts settled law that a levy pursued by a judgment lien creditor "only reaches the interest 
of the debtor in the property, and a judgment creditor can acquire no greater right in the property 
than that 1.vhich the judgment debtor 
in the shoes of 
interest debtor may own; thus, to the extent 
PLAl~HIFF'S OPPOSITION TO PAL!, LLC'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO STRll<E 
PAGE 20 
.. A patiy seeking to enforce c1 judgment 
to any the or a 
debtor no interest, the creditor's interest 
, A and f3 
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extends no further." Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 837; Am. Jur.2d Executions § 120. 
Therefore, when PAL I obtained its judgment lien against Tri-Steel, its lien was subject to 
KeyBank's prior security interest-at that time KeyBank, and not Tri-Steel, owned the 
KeyBank Collateral. 
B. The Idaho Code States No Consequence for a Creditor Who Docs Not File a 
Third Party Claim Under Idaho Code§ 11-203. 
Pal I asserts that "one court has expressly held that a secured party's failure to state the 
dollar amount of its secured claim following levy results in the secured party losing its priority in 
the collateral." PAL I's Brief, at p. 5 ( citing Fiest er v. Production Credit Ass 'n, 426 N.W.2d 676 
(Iowa App. 1988)) (emphasis added). The holdiqg in this Fiester, however, is solely based on 
express language in the Iowa Code that is absent from the Idaho Code. 
In Fiester, the court addressed whether a secured creditor loses its priority interest in 
personal property when it fails to file a statement of the amount of indebtedness in response to a 
judgment creditor's demand for such a statement under the Iowa Code. Iowa Code §§ 626.42 
and 626.48 respectively state (emphasis added): 
For the purpose of enabling the attaching or execution creditor to 
determine the amount to be tendered or deposited to hold the levy 
under the writ of attachment or execution, the person entitled to 
receive payment of the secured debt shall deliver to any such 
person, upon written demand therefor, a statement in writing under 
oath, showing the nature and amount of the original debt, the date 
and the amount of each payment, if any, which has been made 
thereon, and an itemized statement of the amount then due and 
unpaid. 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO PAL I, LLC'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT A!\JD MEIV!ORANDUM I~~ 
OPPOSITION TO STRIKE 
PAGE 21 
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The Idaho Code lacks a similar provision that expressly alters the priority rights of a 
secured creditor who does not file a third party claim under Idaho Code § 11-203. Fi ester's 
reliance on express language in the Iowa Code refutes PAL I's argument. If the Idaho 
legislature had intended a secured creditor to lose its priority, it would have expressly stated that 
result. The absence of a stated consequence demonstrates the filing of a third party claim in 
Idaho is optional and docs not affect Key Bank's vested property right in the KeyBank Collateral 
and Sale Proceeds. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set fo1th above, and in Key Bank's Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment Against PAL I, Key Bank requests the Court grant its Motion and 
deny PAL I's Motion. 
DATED this /~ay of October, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
aw14l 11 -{)~A!::-' ~-- ---
Amber N. Dina 
Attorneys for KeyBank National Association 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO PAL I, LLC'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this rday of October, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was served on. the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (ID Stale Bar ID# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-3 88-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
99278! __ 1 
· Attorneys for KeyBank National Association 
OCT 2 0 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC; DJ. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOJS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of ) 
Case No. CV 10-680 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF AMBER 
N. DINA 
I, AMBER N. DINA, have personal knowledge of the set forth in this afficla vi l, and 
if called to would and could competently testify 
i 
l > I ?,m over lhc age an associate In i Givens 
!Z!oo21ooa 
MON 16: 31 FAX 208) 1300 Givens Pursley 
2. The law firm of Givens Pursley LLP, Thomas Dvorak and I are legal counsel for 
KeyBank National Association (collectively "KeyBank''), in the above-titled action. 
3. As set forth in Paragraphs 20, 24, 25, and 26 of the Complaint for Quiet Title or 
Alternatively for Creditor's Bill (the "Complaint"), KeyBank sued Tri-Steel Construction 
Company, Inc. ("Tri-Steel") in District Court for breach of the 2007 and 2008 Loans and that 
lawsuit was reduced to judgment on June 1, 2010 in the principal amount of $296,500. The 
judgment also provided that Key Bank was entitled to a writ of possession against Tri-Steel. To 
date, the judgment has not been satisfied. 
4. As set forth in Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Complaint, I received from PAL I's 
counsel a copy of an accounting from the Madison County Sheriff's Office that states $16,884.41 
was disbursed to PAL I. 
[ declare under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the state ofldaho and the United 
States that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Amber N. Dina 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lf),)day of October, 20 I 0. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF AMBER N DINA 
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@003/oos 
MON 16: 31 FAX 208 3F 1300 Givens Pursley 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of October, 2010, a true and conect copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
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PAGE 26 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand-Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
















8/20 l!/l MON 16: 31 FAX 208 1300 Givens Pursley 
Thomas E. Dvorak (ID Stale Bar JD# 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (JD State Bar JD# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-3 88-1200 
Facsimile: 208-3 88-1300 
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Attorneys for Key Bank National Association 
MADIS0N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; DJ. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOIS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 






Case No. CV 10-680 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF 
HART 
I, HART, being duly sworn upon oath, states and as follows: 
1 am over of 18 and in support of KeyB 
or to P r, I. 's lv1otion 
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Summary Judgment. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Affidavit have the same 
meaning given in the Complaint and Plaintiffs Opposition to PAL I, LLC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. I make this Affidavit, and all statements contained herein, based upon my 
personal knowledge. 
2. I have reviewed the allegations contained in the Complaint for Quiet Title or 
Alternatively for Creditor's Bill (the "Complaint") and find them to be true and correct, and 
hereby adopt, incorporate, and restate them as my own as if set forth in this Affidavit in full. 
3. In connection with my responsibilities with KeyBank, I was responsible for the 
administration of the 2007 Loan and the 2008 Loan to Tri-Steel Construction Company, Inc. (as 
those terms are used in the Complaint). Having served in that capacity, I am familiar with the 
details of the lending relationship between Key Bank and the parties to the above described loan 
transactions. 
4. It is the regular practice of KeyBank to keep certain records of its regularly 
conducted business activities, which records are made at or near the time of the recorded event. 
am knowledgeable about the record keeping practices of Key Bank. 
5. I have reviewed the Exhibits to the Complaint, and Exhibits A through D arc true 
and correct copies of records made of the regularly conducted business activities of Key Bank, 





Second Affidavit of Jeff Hart 
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I declare n11der penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of ldaho aud the United 
States that the foregoing is true and correct. 
~~ Je Hart 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Ji .. day of October, 2010. 
Second Affidavit of Jeff Hart 
Page 26C 
NOTARY PUBLIC POR IDAHO 
Re;;iding at VJWto Jid,,P(Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this X day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 





Amber N. Dina 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand-Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
Via Facsimile 208-529-4166 
Second Affidavit of Jeff Hart 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (ID State Bar ID# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-3 8 8-1200 
Facsimile: 208-3 88-1300 
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Attorneys for Key Bank National Association 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DJSTRICT FOR THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. BARL'\JEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOIS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RA. Y 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 





Case No. CV 10-680 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUI)PORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PAL I 
or by and 
submits this Brief in Support of for 
I. to this Motion, as set forth in more 
1110021007 
107'25/2010 MON 15: 09 FAX 208 ?, 1300 Givens Pursley 
detail in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Against PAL I and Plaintiffs Opposition to PAL, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, are as 
follows: 
• Key Bank has a validly perfected, first priority security interest in certain property 
(the ''KeyBank Collateral") owned by Tri-Steel Construction Company, Inc. 
("Tri-Steel"), arising out of two $150,000 loans made by Key Bank to Tri-Steel in 
2007 and 2008. 
• Key Bank sued Tri-Steel for breach of the loans and obtained a default judgment 
on June 1, 2010 for $296,500.10. The Judgment also provided that KeyBank was 
entitled to a writ of possession by which the sheriff would seize the KeyBank 
Collateral and put it in KeyBank's possession. 
@ While KeyBank was in the process of obtaining its Judgment against Tri-Steel, 
PAL I, an unsecured judgment creditor, caused the Madison County Sheriff to 
levy the KeyBank Collateral. 
o Despite repeated communication with counsel for PAL I and the Madison County 
Sheriffs office informing them that KeyBank legally owned the seized Collateral, 
the June 9, 2010 auction proceeded as scheduled. 
® According to an accounting provided by the Sheriff's Office, $16,884.41 was 
disbursed to PAL I (the "Sale Proceeds"). 
As a secured creditor with priority over PAL I, a mere judgment lien creditor, 
KeyBank's right in the Sale Proceeds is superior to PAL I. However, PAL I asserts KeyBank 
waived its first position priority by failing to file a third paiiy claim under Idaho Code § 11-203. 
This argument contradicts settled law that a prior secured creditor trumps a subsequent 
judgment lien creditor. Therefore, the Court should grant KeyBank summary judgment and 
require PAL I to pay over to Key Bank all Proceeds it received from the 9, 2010 
ci.uction. 
REPLY BRIEE IN SUPPORT OE PLAINTIEE'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
PAGE 28 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. KcyBank is Entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Because 
there is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that Plaintiff is a Secured 
Creditor that has Priority Over PAL I. 
As set forth in Plaintiffs Opposition to PAL I LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed on October 18, 2010, a secured creditor has a vested property right that cannot be waived, 
and had the Idaho Legislature intended to alter such a vested right through Idaho Code § 11-203, 
it would have expressly stated that intent. In addition to the protections afforded a secured 
creditor under the Uniform Commercial Code, Idaho Code§ 8-506A specifically requires that a 
judgment creditor attaching personal property subject to a security interest follow a procedure 
that will protect and preserve the security interest. As explained by Section § 8-506A ( emphasis 
added): 
L .. .1 
Personal property subject to a security interest ... may be attached 
by the following methods, and no other: 
(a) Personal property capable of manual delivery may be attached 
by taking possession, provided all secured parties with a perfected 
security interest therein under the Id_aho uniform commercial cod~ 
consent thereto in writing, and the attachment shall be subject to 
the rights of any secured party under a perfected security 
agreement, but otherwise would be to the same effect and in the 
same manner as if the property were not subject to the security 
agreement. 
(b) If any secured party with a perfected security interest does not 
consent in writing that the sheriff take possession of the personal 
prope1iy, the attaching_ creditor must 12ay or tender to the secured 
j;larty the amount due on the securitv agreement before the officer 
may take the orop_grty intQ_QOssession. The attaching creditor upon 
so redeeming shall be subrogated to the rights of the secured party 
under security and , upon 
payment or tender security agreement, note or notes so 
paid, and any filed financi statements to the ng creditor. 
Upon any sale by judicial any amounts O\Ving to the 
attaching 
il]004/007 
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Obtaining the secured creditor's written permission (or paying the secured about due) 
prior to attaching its collateral is likewise required under Idaho law prior to levying secured 
property under a writ of execution. See Fulton v. Duro, 107 Idaho 240, 687 P.2d 1367 (Ct. App. 
1984) ("We believe that the legislature intended that the method of levying under a writ of 
attachment was also to be used to levy under a writ of execution."). In this case, PAL I did not 
obtain Key Bank's written permission to levy the Key Bank Collateral, nor did PAL I tender to 
KeyBank the amount due on its security agreement. 
PAL I's disregard of Idaho law is not excused by its alleged compliance with Idaho 
Code § 11-203. Idaho Code § 11-203 states that within 14 days of receiving notice that his 
prope1iy has been levied upon by another creditor, the third paiiy "shall prepare a written claim 
setting forth the grounds upon which he claims the property ... and the dollar amount of the 
claim." Under Idaho Code§ 8-527, this same rule applies to a third party who has an interest in 
personal property that has been attached, garnished or executed upon. It would be inconsistent 
'or the Idaho legislature to afford specific protections to preserve security interests in personal 
)roperty while at the same time allowing a secured creditor to somehow "waive" its vested 
)roperly right by not filing a third pa1iy claim. 1 A consistent interpretation of the Idaho Code 
·egarding attachment and levy of personal property is that a secured creditor, by nature of its 
;ested property right, is nQ1 required to file a third party claim to preserve its secured interest. 
Such a third pa1iy claim is optional, and by vi1iue of Idaho Code § 8-506A, inapplicable to 
;ecured creditors. 
---··--·~------~---
the of secured creditors is nccessJry \Vhen the secured to 
writ of execution since.·. unlike 1vith or a::achrncnt I.C. § no boiiCl is 
of exe,:utio1:. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff KeyBank National Association respectfully 
requests that the Court grant its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against PAL I and order 
PAL I to pay over to Key Bank all Sale Proceeds it received from the June 9,2010 auction. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
Amber N. Dina 
Attorneys for Key Bank National Association 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25111 day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 




Amber N. Dina 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PAL I 
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Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand-Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
Via Facsimile 208-529-4166 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
Amber N. Dina (ID State Bar ID# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for KeyBank National Association 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DAVIS, an individual; 
LOIS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
Plai!1tiff National iation 
Case No. CV 10-680 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
PAL I, LLC'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
" or by and 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley submits this Oppos1tion to PAL I, LLC's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 23, 2010, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting KeyBank's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against PAL I and denying PAL I's competing Motion 
(the "Memorandum Decision"). PAL I filed a Motion for Reconsideration on or about January 
10, 201 l. 
PAL I asserts Idaho Code § 11-203 allows an unsecured judgment creditor to defeat a 
secured creditor's priority if the secured creditor does not file a third party claim. As set forth 
below, due to the rules of statutory construction and the protections afforded secured creditors 
under Idaho law, KeyBank's lack of a filed third party claim under Idaho Code § 11-203 does 
not work a forfeiture of its secured interest. 1 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Established Rules of Statutory Construction Require the Court to Deny 
PAL I's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Idaho Code § 11-203 states that within 14 days of receiving notice that his secured 
property bas been levied upon by another creditor, a third party creditor "shall prepare a written 
claim setting forth the grounds upon which he claims the prope1iy ... and the dollar amount of 
the claim." Under Idaho Code § 8-527, this same rule applies to a third party creditor who has 
an interest in personal property that has been attached, garnished or executed upon. PAL I 
argues KcyBank waived its vested right in the collateral at issue by failing to file a third party 
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-203. However, as held by the Court in its tv1emorandum 
Decision, Idaho Code § J 1-203 is not intended to affect a secured creditor's interest, 
especially in light of Idaho Code § 28-9-315. 
the focts set forth in ils \1en1orandun1 in of ;-v1otion for Partial 
to PAL l's Motion for 
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Idaho Code § 28-9-315 concerns a secured party's right upon the disposition of 
collateral, and expressly states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and in section 28-
2-403(2): 
(1) A security interest or agricultural lien continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange or other 
disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the 
disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien; and 
(2) A security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of 
collateral. 
As this Court notes, "the statute clearly implies that a perfected security interest survives 
the failure to comply with I.C. § 11-203 because the repercussions for failing to file an 
exception are not provided for under I.C. § 11-203 or 28-2-403(2)." See Memorandum and 
Decision, p. 4. PAL I asserts the Court has violated the rules of statutory construction by 
applying the Idaho Code § 28-9-315 in a way that renders § 11-203 a nullity. PAL I further 
asserts that because Idaho Code § 11-203 is "more specific" than Idaho Code § 28-8-315 and 
was enacted after Idaho Code § 28-9-315, it should operate to defeat Key Bank's secured interest 
in the collateral. These arguments are not well taken. 
Under Idaho law, where the words of a statute are subject to more than one meaning, to 
determine the intent of the legislature, the court examines not only the literal words of the 
statute, "but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the 
stalutc, and its legislative history." Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 Idaho 449, 235 P.3d 399, 402 
(2010). As 111 
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decline to presume a redundancy between entire statutes. Rather, 
statutes in pari materia (relating to the same subject) are construed 
as complementary and cohesive. 
See also State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 829, 230 P.3d 437, 439 (2010) ("we must reconcile 
apparent inconsistencies between statutes if it is possible to do so."). Only where two statues 
are in "irreconcilable conflict" does the more recently enacted statute govern. Id. 
In this case, the Court apparently construed Idaho Code Sections 11-203 and 28-9-315, 
which both relate to the sale of secured property, as complimentary and cohesive, rather than 
conflicting. As noted by PAL I, Idaho Code Section 11-203 was enacted after Section 28-9-
315, and therefore the legislature was presumed to be aware of the mandate in 28-9-315 that a 
"security interest . . . continues in collateral notwithstanding sale." Had the legislature intended 
a secured creditor to lose its priority by failing to file a third party claim under Idaho Code § 11-
203, one would have expected the legislature to expressly state that result. Section 11-203 as 
written is complimenta1y and cohesive with Section 28-9-315. Read together, these statute 
make it clear that the filing of a third paiiy claim in Idaho is optional and does not affect 
KeyBank's vested property right in the collateral and sale proceeds. 
PAL I further argues that Western Idaho Production Credit Ass 'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, 
Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 678 P .2d 52 (1984), supports its argument that a secured creditor may 
waive its vested rights in its collateral simply by failing to file a claim. Western Idaho 
specifically deals with the application of the language in former I.C. § 28-9-306(2) (similar to 
the current in Idaho Code § 28-9-315), which provided that a interest 
continues m collateral notwithstanding_0"9le, exchange or disposition thereof unless 
by secured party 1n the secur1 ty or 
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a perfected security interest in grain that was sold. The Court found that the security interest 
would be enforceable against the buyer unless the sale was authorized by WIPCA. The 
analysis then turned on whether or not the sale was authorized by WIPCA, with the court 
determining authorization did occur. Id. ("The course of dealing between WIPCA and the 
farmers and the policies of WIPCA clearly indicate the authorization to sell crops in which 
WIPCA held security interests and that WIPCA further authorized this particular sale by the 
farmers to Martin."). 
PAL I's argument erroneously equates an express authorization of a sale with an alleged 
waiver due to inactivity by a creditor who does not file a third party claim under Idaho Code § 
11-203. Even if waiver is recognized as a common law background principle supplementing the 
UCC (as is argued by PAL I), simple failure to participate in a third party claim proceeding 
should not constitute a waiver. Waiver has been defined as "a voluntary, intentional 
relinquishment of a known right or advantage." Frontier Federal S'av, And Loan Ass 'n v, 
Douglas, 123 Idaho 808, 816, 853 P.2d 553,561 (1993). In the instant case, KeyBank's actions, 
unlike the course of performance of the secured creditor in Western Idaho, did not affirmatively 
authorize the sale of its collateral. 2 There simply is no fair warning in the statutory language 
that forfeiture of a valuable property right results from a failure to file a third party claim. 
Furthermore, it would be illogical to hold that KeyBank somehow "waived" its vested right 
when to the contrary it was actively seeking to levy upon the collateral prior to the June 9, 2010 
2 In addition, as previously "we.iver" of an only applies to debtors, An exemption that may be 
expressly v.'aived by a debtor under sta,uto:·y law is nol equivalent to a secured creditor's vested An 
is defined as a debtor by law, allowing the dc:btor lo retain certain 
property without liabil eel, 1999) statutes arc 11ot lo 
benefit or protect creditorsll 1 rathc\r to the dc.btor, and rna~/ be \Vcdvcd,'l 31 An1. Jur. 
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PAL I sale and expressly protested the sale in written and oral communication with counsel for 
PAL I and the sheriff's office: 
B. Idaho Law Requires a Judgment Creditor Seeking to Sell Secured Personal 
Property to Comply with Idaho Code§ 8-506A. 
Idaho Code § 8-506A specifically requires that a judgment creditor attaching personal 
property subject to a security interest follow a procedure that will protect and preserve the 
security interest. As explained by Section§ 8-506A (emphasis added): 
Personal pro.12erty subject to a security interest ... may be attached 
by the following methods, and no other: 
(a) Personal property capable of manual delivery may be attached 
by taking possession, provided all secured parties with a perfected 
security interest therein under the Idaho uniform commercial code 
consent thereto in writing, and the attachment shall be subject to 
the rights of any secured party under a perfected securitv 
agreement, but otherwise would be to the same effect and in the 
same manner as if the property were not subject to the security 
agreement. 
(b) If any secured party with a perfected security interest does not 
consent in writing that the sheriff take possession of the personal 
property, the attaching creditor must pay or tender to the secured 
party the amount due on the security agreement before the officer 
may take the property into gossession .... Upon any sale by 
judicial proceedings, any amounts owing to the attaching creditor 
on the security agreement so redeemed, with lawful interest 
thereon, shall first be paid to the attaching creditor. 
Despite PAL I's asse1iions to the contrary, obtaining the secured creditor's written 
permission ( or paying the secured amount due) is likewise required under Idaho law Drior to 
levving secured personal prn_ru;m under a writ of execution. In this case, PAL I did not obtain 
KcyBank's written to , nor did P to 
KeyBank the amount due on its security p I attempts to excuse its disregard of 
Idaho ng r claho Code § 1s inapplicable to the instant case 
rcc,,sons, 1 th only to pre-
[d]007/0ll 







































judgment writs of attachment, not post-judgment writs of execution. All of PAL I's arguments 
are without merit. 
Idaho Code § 8-506 provides a mandatory procedure for levying on real property, and 
where those procedures are not followed the sale must be set aside. See Fulton v. Duro, 107 
Idaho 240, 687 P.2d 1367 (Ct. App. 1984). Just as the provisions ofidaho Code§ 8-506 are 
mandatory, so are the similar provisions of Idaho Code § 8-506A regarding attachment of 
personal property subject to a security agreement. As explained by the Court in Fulton v. Dura, 
"the legislature intended that the method of levying under a writ of attachment was also to be 
used to levy under a writ of execution. '[A]ll ... property both real and personal, or any interest 
in either real or personal prope1ty ... may be attached on execution in like manner as upon writs 
of attachment.' I.C. § 11-201." Id. at 246. 
Requiring a levying judgment creditor to obtain authorization from a secured creditor 
prior to selling the secured collateral under a writ of execution is consistent with Idaho Code § 
28-9-315, which states that a "security interest ... continues in collateral notwithstanding sale 
... unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest." LC.§ 28-9-
31 S(a)(l) ( emphasis added). 
It would be contradictory for the Idaho legislature to afford specific protections to 
preserve security interests in personal prope1ty while at the same time allowing a secured 
creditor to somehow "waive" its vested prope1iy right by not filing a third party claim.3 A 
consistent interpretation of the Idaho Code regarding atlach,nent, levy and/or personal 
property is that a secured creditor, by nature of its vested property right, is required to file a 
third party claim to preserve under Idaho Code § 11-203 where it has not 
the re:quirernents of Ii:faho Code§ I !-203 li'.:e,vise 
upon. 
to c: third p~rly credito!' '.vho h:1s an ir;l·~'rc~;t in 
S'cc I.C § 8-5'27. 
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authorized sale of its collateral under Idaho Code§ 8-506A. 
C. The Equal Protection Clause Does Not Prohibit Disparate Treatment of 
Key Bank and PAL Since they Belong to Different Classes. 
According to PAL I, the Court's interpretation of Idaho Code § 11-203 "thwarts the 
intent of the Equal Protection Clause that 'all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated 
alike."' See PAL I's Brief, p. 14. Notably, as is the case between KeyBank and PAL I, "the 
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit states from treating different classes of people 
differently." Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467, 235 P.3d 
1188, 1191 (2010) (emphasis added). Despite PAL I's assertions to the contrary, its position as 
a judgment lien creditor is distinct from KeyBank's secured creditor status. 
KeyBank has a vested property right in the collateral and resulting sale proceeds. A 
secured creditor is a party "who has the right, on the debtor's default, to proceed against 
collateral and apply to it payment of the debt" Black's Law Dictionary 376 (7th ed. 1999). A 
secured creditor's priority in specific property becomes secured on the date its security interest 
is perfected. LC. § 28-9-203. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest is only 
subordinate to the rights of a judgment lien creditor (like PAL I) that becomes a judgment lien 
creditor before the security interest is perfected. LC. § 28-9-317(a)(A); see also Mellor v. 
Pistole, 734 f'.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (A "judgment lien creditor is not a bona fide 
purchaser, and therefore is subject to all prior interests in the property, whether known or 
unknown, recorded or unrecorded."). Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause is inapposite to 
I, arc not 
A more pertinent Constitutional consideration is whether PAL I's interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 11-203 as itling a to its security interest vvould 
as 1 is 
lil]009/0l.1. 
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the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions, requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given 
meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Idaho v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 
544, 211 P.3d 787, 789 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Idaho Code 11-203 contains no 
language expressly stating a consequence for a secured creditor who fails to file a third pmty 
claim. Therefore, should the Court adopt the interpretation of Idaho Code § 11-203 asserted by 
PAL I and find that KeyBank lost its security interest in the collateral, KeyBank would have 
received no meaningful notice that its failure to file a third party claim would cause such a 
result. 
HI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Key Bank requests the Court should deny PAL I's Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
D-fl,'-
DA TED this _/_6_ day of January, 2011. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Amber N. Dina 
Attorneys for Key Bank National Association 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Cctay of January, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
BJ. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
D Via U.S. Mail 
D Via Hand-Delivery 
D Via Overnight Delivery 
Ji..._ Via Facsimile 208-529-4166 
AmberN. Dina 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO PAL I, LLC'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
PAGE 42 
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Amber N .. Dina (ID Sti:W) Bar ID# 7708) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
:Post Office Box 2720 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENT.H JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking 11ssociation, 
Plai.mif1~ 
V 
PAL l, LLC, an fdaho limite(l liahilhy 
company; .BRIAN CH.RlSTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A PARI<JNSON,an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, JNC.; D.l BARNEY, s.n 
individual; \VILLI/\.M DAVIS, an individuat 
LOIS DAVIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, Hn individnat; andDELL J. 




Plain:tiff Key Bank National. Assod.ation, 
to khho Appellate Rules 
Oil P 
docurncms 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST 




Case No. CV 10·680 
PLA!NTiFFiS ORJEC'rION TO 
CLE.RK.18 RECORD AND 
REQUEST il'OR AD.Drno.r"1AL 
noCUJ>,1Er ... 1TS 
of n~cord, 
hereby objecls to the 
l. 
on 
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l. PlaintHP's Memorandtm1 in Support of Motion for Partial Stm:unary Judgment 
Against PAL 1 (dated 10/5/2010); 
2, Affidavit of Amber N. Dina in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial .Summary 
J1.1dg.m.ent Against PAL I. (dated l 0/5/201 O); 
3, /\ffidavit of.Jeff Hart (dated 10/5/2(HO\ 
4.. Pl.aintifCs Opposition to PAL 1 LLC':s Motion. for Summary Judgment and 
Mcrnorandu.rn in Opposition to Mcition to Stdke (dated 10/18/2010); 
5., St~cond Affidavit of AmberN. Dina (dated 10/20/201 O); 
6.. Second Affidavit of Jeff Hart (dated 10/20/201 O); 
7.. Reply Brief in Support of Plain.tifrs Motio11 for Partial Summary Judgment 
Against Pl\LT (dated 10/25/201 O); 
~L Plaintiff's Opposi1fon to PAL T LLC's Motion for Reconsideration (dated 
]/18/2010). 
No bearing is requested. Plaintiff's counsel has. spoken with counsel for Defendant PAL 
I, LLC who indicated they would waive the right 10 a hearing, 
,nt;,+ 
i)ATET) this dt .... day or June, 2011. 
GJVENS PUR.SLEY LLF 
A:ttorneys for Key Bank Nati.onLl'.l Associ~1tion 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST 
FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
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CERTIFICATE OJ? Sl:RVlCE 
~;tlr---· 
I HEREBY CER'TifY that on thi.s 12$'..u. day of June., 20.l l, a true and. correct copy of the 
foregoing was served on the following by the manner il1dicated: 
BryM D. Smith 
:13.l Ddscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shonp Av~, 
.P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls., ID 83405 
Via US. Mail 
Via .Hand-Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
Via Fa,:simile 20.8-529~4166 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST 
FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
PAGE 45 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISBN 4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISBN 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
PAL I, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an individual; L.A. 
PARKINSON, an individual; BARNEY DAIRY, 
INC.; D.J. BARNEY, an individual; WILLIAM 
DAVIS, an individual; LOIS DAVIS, an 
individual; DELL RAY BARNEY, an individual; 
and DELLJ. BARNEY, an individual, dba 
Barney Towing & Recovery, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-680 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
COMES NOW the defendant, PAL I, LLC, by and through its counsel of record, 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq., of the firm of Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and files this notice 
of non-opposition to the plaintiff's Objection to Clerk's Record and Request for 
Additional Documents dated June 28, 2011. PAL does not oppose the addition to the 
clerk's record on appeal of those documents identified by plaintiff in its objection. 
NOT!CE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO PLAINTiH'S OB.I TO CLE 
DOCU l 
F :\CLI ENTS\flcJS\8308\P ,ea dings\024 Notice. Non-0 pposition .Clerk's Record.doc 
.. 
DATED this 29 day of June, 2011. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC ,,... 
B.J~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this c::i?;day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS to be served, by placing 
the same ina sealed envetope and dep:ositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak, Esq. 
Amber N. Dina, Esq. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
NOTICE Of I\JON-OPPOSITION TO PLAl 
[ ] lj_,,,S. Mail 
[~Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
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601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
l(EYBI"~NK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINS ON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOIS DA VIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Barney Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-680 
ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
These matters having come before the Court upon Plaintiff's Objection to Clerk's Record 
and Requestfor Additional Documents and Defendant PAL I's Notice of Non-Opposition re 
same having limits set forth in 
good cause appearing therefore; 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECEORD 
AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIOI\JAL DOCUMEf\lTS 
PAGE 48 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection to Clerk's Record and Request for 
CT,ERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
foregoing was served on the following by the manner · clicated: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Amber N. Dina 
GNENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock 
Boise, ID 83702 
Bryan D. Smith 
BJ. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 







Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand-Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
Via Facsimile 208-529-4166 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand-Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
Via Facsimile 208-529-4166 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECEORD 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
Alexander P. McLaughlin (lD State Bar ID# 7977) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
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1 MADISON COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an individual; 
BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. BARNEY, an 
individual; WILUAM DA VIS, an individual; 
LOIS DA VIS, an individual; DELL RAY 
BARNEY, an individual; and DELL J. 
BARNEY, an individual, dba Bfl.flleY Towing 
& Recovery, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV 10-680 
AFFlDA VIT OF KEITH 
CHRISTENSEN 
COMES NOW, Keith Clu·istensen, your affiant, who being first duly sworn, deposes, 
states and avers as follows: 
l. I am currently employed as a Deputy Sheriff with the Bonnevme County Sheriff's 
Depmtment. I make this affidavit ba};cd upon my personal knowledge and to the best of my 
infonnation and belief. 
1t1Joo21009 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH CHRI STE NSEN 
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2. On June 2, 2011, in the course of my duties1 I caused to be personally served and 
did, in fact, personally serve certain papers upon one Gregory Meacham, the registered agent of 
PALI> LLC. 
3. The papers were served on June 2, 2011, at 16:20 hours. 
4. Among the papers that were served on Mr. Meacham was a Claim of Exemption, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
this reference. 
5. I am further aware that our office, although it had been pl'Ovided by Plaintiffs 
counsel with an envelope addressed to mail a copy of the Claim of Exemption at the time of 
service to Mr. B. J. Driscoll, did not send a copy to Mr. Driscoll, It was our belief that because 
no :money had been seized as part of the execution, that sending a copy of the Claim of 
Exemption to Mr. Driscoll was not necessary. 
6. However, again, the Claim of Exemption in the form attached hereto was, in fact, 
served on Mr. Gregory Meacham along with the other documents served by this office. 
FURTHER YOUR AF FI ANT SA YETH NAU.GJIT, ~ 
~~ 
Keith Christensen 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this_ day of 1uly, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH CHRISTENSEN 
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dul. 7. 2011 2:11PM Br2:1Civil Division 208-529-i483 No. 3244 Ii ' ;-, r, it/ I 
07/07/2011 THU 11:~S FAX 2D8 ~88 1300 Givens PU~Sley ~004/009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7 ~ay of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith ):( Via U.S. Mail 
B. J. Driscoll D Via Band-Delivery 
Smith Driscoll & Associates, PLLC D Via OVernight Delivery 
414 Shoup Ave. D ViaFacsimile 208-529-4166 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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4<!ui. 7. L~II L:IL~M e· ·; Civil Division 208-529-1483 No. 3244 P. 6/7 
IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE/NOTICIA LEGAL IMPORTANTE 
MONEY/PERSONAL PROPERTY BELONGING TO YOU MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR HELD IN ORDER TO SATISFY A COURT JUDGMENT. YOU MAY BE ABLE TO 
GET YOUR MONEY/PROPERTY BACK SO READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. 
SI SOLAMENTE HABLA ESPANOL PUEDE OBrENER. UNA FORMA EN ESPANOL EN EL DEPARTAMENTO DEL SHERIFE. 
The enclosed writ of execution and/or notice of g~mlshment has directed the sheriff to take custody by levying on your money and/or personal property In order 
to satlsl'y a couttjudgment. The sheriff has levied on your money and/or personal property, You have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after the date of malling or 
personal service of these documents to fUe a dalm of exemp~on with the sherllf. An exemption from levy entitles you to obtain the release M your money and 
personal property. The following Is a partlal 11st of money and personal property tfl!lt may be exempt rrom levy, EXEMPTIONS ARE PROVIDED BY IDAHO AND 
FEOEAAL LAW AND CAN BE FOUND IN THE IDAHO CODE AND IN THE UNITED STATI:S CODE. MOST OF THE EXEMPTIONS PROVIDED BY THE STATE ARE; 
CONTAINED lN CHAPTER 6, TITLE 11, IDAHO CODE. GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, ssr, VETERANS, RAILROAD RETIREMENT, 
MILITARY, AND WELFARE ARE EXEMPT FROM LEVY 1N MOST OOES UNDER FEDERAL LAW. This list may not be complete Md rnay not include all exemptions 
that 11pply.Jn you( ~i.:~ .. Qlil~Yli!Ulf°.Perlodlc changes In the law. Additlonally, some.of.the-exemptions may not apply-ln-full-or1.mder.all-tircumstanceli; :niere·may 
be spedal requirements for child support. You or your altol'ney should read the exemption statutes which apply to you. 
tr you believe the money or persona/ property that are being levied upon 1$ exernpt, you should Immediately file a claim of exemption. If vou fall to make a 
tlmely claim of exemption, the sheriff will release money to the plalntlff, or the property may be sold at an execution sale, perhaps at a price substaMally below 
its value, and you may have to bring further court action to recover the money and property. 
The sheriff cari11ot give you legal advice. Therefore, Jr you h,we any questions concerning your right:$ In thi~ action, you should consult an 
attorney as soon as po"lble. You may contact the nearest offic:a of tdaho legal aid services, Inc:. to lriquiri, if you are ellglble for their 
asslsta11ce. 
SOME EXEMPTIONS TO WHICH YOU MAY BE ENTITLED 
Type of Money and Property 
L Aflmony, support, maintenance (money or property) 
2, Appliances (household) {$750 per Item, up to $5,000 gross) 
3. Annuity contract payments 
4. Bodlly fn)Ury and wrongful death awards* 
5. Books (professlonal) up to $2,500 
6. Burial plots 
7. Child support payments"' 
8. Disability or IUness benefits'" 
9. Furnishings (household) ($750 per Item, up to $7,500 gross) 
10. Health aids 
11. Homestead, house, mobile home, .ind related structures 
n. Jewelry (up to $1,000 a99regate value) 
13. Ufe Insurance beneflts payable to spouse or dependent* 
14. Medical and/or hospital benefits 
15. Military ret1rement and SU(\lfvor's benet1ts 
16. Motor vehkle; car, truck, motorcycle with 1.1 value of up to $7,000 
per person 
17, Pension: stock bonus, profit sharing annultY, or similar plans 
18. Personal property: ($750 per lte!rl, up to $7,500 gross) (fumishlngs, 
appliances, one firearm, animals, rnuslcal lnstrumen!'.5:, books, 
dothes, family portn1its and heirlooms) 
19, Public assistance: federal, state, or local Including: Aid to Aged, Bllnd 
and Disabled (AABD); Aid to Dependent Chifdren (AFDC); Ald to 
Permanently and Totafly Disabled {A?TD) 
20. Publlc Employee's Benefil;S including Federal Civil Service Retirement, 
Idaho Retirement and Dlsabillty 
2l, Railroad Retirement Beneftts 
22. Retirement, pensfon or profit sharing plan qualified by IRS 
23. Social Security Disability and Retfrement Benefits 
24. SSI (Supplemental Security Insurance Benefits) 
25. Tool,; of trade and Implements up to $2,500 
26. Unemployment benefits 
27. Veterans benefits and insurance 
26, Wages or salary: Consumer debts primarily for personal or 
househotd purposes: exemption 15 30 times the federal minimum 
wage or 25% or disposable income, whichever Is greater. 
Noo.coosumer debts: exemption Is 30 times the federal minirnum 
wage or 25% or disposable income, whichever Is greater 
29, Worker's compensation 
30. langib/e Person;;il Property (not to exceed $800 v<Jlue) 
31. An unmatured life Insurance contract other than a credit life 
Insurance contract 
32. An aggregate Interest not to exceed $5,000, In any accrued dMdend 
or Interest under, or loan value of, an unmatured life Insurance 
contract under which the Insured Is the lndividual or <1 person of 
whom the lndlvldu.if Is a crependent 
* To the extent reasonably necessary for support of family and if not 
commingled with other funds. 
I 
[n order to claim an exemption from exerutlon and garnishment under Idaho and federal law, you, the d~f,;md;,mt, Judgment debtor, or a third party, holding or 







L DELIVER OR MAIL A CLAIM OF EXEMPTION TO THE SHERIFF WHO LEVIED UPON YOUR MONEY AND/OR PERSONAL PROPERTY AT 605 N. CAPITAL 
AVE, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER MAILING OR PERSONAL 5ERV1Ct; Of THESE INSTRUCTIONS, NOTICE Of EXEMPTIONS AND FORM FOR 
FI/JNG A W.JM OF i:XEM?TION. IF YOU MAIL A CLAIM OF EXEMPT!ON, IT Mi.Js:Y BE RECEIVED SY TH!:: SHERIJ'F WITHIN iHE FOURTEl:N (14) DAY 
2, s!1edtf has to or- creditor va1lthfn onG (1) e;<eiud:r,g v;eo1<ends mid t10!:dJ
1
{'.), thut fi'.e;d o dain~ cf 
3. 
e.~emptlon. The judgment has business days, excluding weekends holid;;iy,, afrnr th~ date notice was that a claim or 
e~emptkm was fll@d with the sheriff, to nl@ a mollon with tl1e court contestJng the dafm of exemption. 
Jf the judgment creditor no~f:es: U1e sheriff that he will not object to the claim of exemption or doe:; not r1re a motion with tt1e court contesting tt1e claim 
or exernption, tl1e sl,edff wlfl Immediately rerurn tl1e money Md/or prop~rcy or notify the bank or institution to release the money 
and/or personal prop~rty which has been levlc:d upon. 
4. rF TriE JUDGMENT CR::DITOR DOES FILE A MOTION WITH THE' COURT CONTESTING THE CLAIM OF YOU, THE JUDGMEN1 DEBTOR OR 
ANY INTERESTED THIRD WILL RECE!:'JE A COPY 0." THE MOTION NJD NOTICE Of' HEN?JcJG. A WILL BE HELD WITHIN NOY LESS 
THAN F!VE ($) NOR MOR\'.:. TWf:.l'JE (12) Dfi,YS AFTER mt F1LI:'ICo D,S.TE OF THr: MOTIO('!. YOU SHOULD 91:.P~tEP."s!l.ED 10 EX?LA!N T'rii;, 
GROUNDS FOR CL}JMI~,lG IN CC)UrtT ON THE DATE /iJJD TL":E SET FOR. THE YOU SHOULD BRING VVHATEVER 
YOU HAV2 YO 
,) ' 
you 
. , , ·,·Jul. 7. 2011 2:12PM B'.lCivil Division 208-529-1483 II "1'1 A A n "l /, l~O. JL't't r. // I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ____ .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ___ ~----~-------
---~---------~-' 
~--------------.> Case No .. _________ _ 
Plalntlff(S), 
vs CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
--------~----~---) AND/OR THIRD·PARTY CLAIM 
___________________ ) 
Defendant{S) 
I claim an exemption from levy for the followlng described money and/or property: 
Money, induding money in a bank account, which was paid to me or my family as: 
_ Public assistance of any kind 
_ Social security or SSI 
_ Worker's compensation 
_ Unemployment benefits 
_ Chlld support 
_ Retirement, pension, or profit sharing benefits 
_ Milltary or veterans benefits 
life insurance or other Insurance 
_ Dlsabllity, lllness1 medical or hospltal benefits 
_ Alimony, support or maintenance 
_ Annuity contract beneAts 
_ Bodfly injury or wrongful death awards 
_ · Other money (describe) . 
_ Wages (Do not check this box until you have first talked to your employer to see If he correctly calculated 
your exempt[on according to the formula under ltem 28 on the form entitled "SOME EXEMPTIONS TO WHICH 
YOU MAY BE ENmLED." Then check this box only if you believe your employer's calculatlon rs Incorrect.) 
Property: 
Professional books 
_ Burial plots 
Health alds 
_ Homestead, house, mobile home and related structures 
~ Jewelry 
_ Car, truck or motorcycle 
_ Tools and implements 
_ Appliances, Furnlshlngs, firearms, animals, musical instruments, books, clothes, family portraits and 
heirlooms 
_ Other property 
or g~pre,sentative 




Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
Alexander P. McLaughlin (ID State Bar ID# 7977) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-3 88-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
1206209_1 (10894-2) 
Attorneys for KeyBank National Association 
MADISON COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KEYBANKNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
a national banking association, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BRIAN CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; L.A. PARKINSON, an 
individual; BARNEY DAIRY, INC.; D.J. 
BARNEY, an individual; WILLIAM 
DA VIS, an individual; LOIS DA VIS, an 
individual; DELL RAY BARNEY, an 
individual; and DELL J. BARNEY, an 
individual, dba Barney Towing & 
Recovery, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-680 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF KEYBANK'S 
MOTION CONTESTING PAL I, LLC'S 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PAL I, 
LLC'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT, 
AND MOTION TO DISCHARGE 
ATTACHMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff KeyBank National Association ("KeyBank" or "Plaintiff'), by 
and through its counsel of record, Givens Pursley LLP, 
of KeyBank's Motion Contesting I, LLC's 
hereby submits this Reply in 
of Exemption and Response in 
REPLY IN/UPPORT OF KEYBANK'S MOTION CONTESTING PAL 1, LLC'S 
CLAIM 0, EXEMPTION AND RESPONSE iN OPPOSITION TO PAL I, LLC'S 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, MOTION TO SC:T ASIDE JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISCHARGE ATIACHMENT 
1NTESTING PAL l, LLC'S CLAIM OF EXEMl)TION 
S JvIOT!ON TO CONSOLIDATE, MOTION TO SET 
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Opposition to PAL I, LLC's Motion to Consolidate, Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and Motion 
to Discharge Attachment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By means of its claim of exemption and pending motions, PAL I, LLC ("PAL") argues 
(a) that this lawsuit and the associated rights are not in fact attachable as a "chose in action"; (b) 
that alleged common questions of fact and law between the above-captioned matter and the post-
judgment lawsuit of Zion's First National Bank ("Zion's") v. PAL I, LLC somehow merits 
undoing the judgment and appeal; (c) that the foregoing lawsuit is newly discovered evidence 
and that the money judgment issued in this suit is somehow prospective in nature under Rule 
60(b)(5) of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ("IRCP"); and (d) that an alleged failure to 
serve a claim of exemption with the attachment rises to the level of an irregularity that should 
overturn the attachment and execution. 
PAL' s arguments lack merit because: 
@ An appeal is a chose in action. PAL's appeal is a chose in action and our Supreme 
Court has stated the same in Smith v. Corlett, wherein the Court expressly pem1itted 
respondent Cathy Rosera to satisfy her judgment by levying on James M. Smith's 
appeal and then dismissing it, despite the fact that the judgment emanated from the 
very appeal on which levy was sought; 
this of to consolidate. This Court does 
not have jurisdiction to consolidate this case under Rule 13(b) of the IDAHO 
APPELLATE RULES In addition, consolidation is 
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are pending claims. Because judgment has been entered and an appeal has been 
taken, the substantive portion of this case is no longer "pending before the coup:"; 
• Zion's security interest is old hat and IRCP 60(b) is inapplicable. The fact that 
Zion's filed an action after this Court entered judgment does not constitute "newly 
discovered evidence" under IRCP 60(b)(2) as Zion's secured claim has been known 
to PAL since even before the current lawsuit was filed. Moreover, a money judgment 
is not "prospective" relief under IRCP 60(b)(5); and 
• PAL' s registered agent received a claim of exemption and PAL in fact drafted 
and filed its own claim of exemption. There is no basis to discharge Key Bank's 
attachment because PAL cured any alleged irregularity by filing its own claim of 
exemption. Further, LC. § 8-534 has no application because it applies only to 
prejudgment attachment and has no relevance once judgment is entered. 
• Bottom line. PAL is simply trying to skirt the requirement that it post a bond to stay 
execution of a judgment on appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
1.) KeyBank's Motion Contesting PAL, I, LLC's Claim of Exemption should be granted 
because an appeal is a chose in action and, in any event, may still be levied upon to 
satisfy a money judgment. 
PAL argues that an appeal is not a chose in action. On its face, this position ignores the 
fact that "chose in action" is a synonym for a lawsuit or legal claim and that an appeal is simply a 
subpart of a lawsuit or legal claim. In any event, our Idaho Supreme Court implicitly rejected 
this argument in v. Corlett, 37060-2009. The was 
attorney of record in the foregoing matter. The undersigned is therefore, farnil with 
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arguments presented therein. This is significant as PAL's claim, that an appeal is not a chose in 
action, was likewise raised by appellant James M. Smith ("Smith"). As stated, Smith's argument 
was rejected by our Idaho Supreme Court. Presumably, this was a result of the fact that the 
Court found Rosera's arguments more persuasive than Smith's. This mandates examination of 
the arguments Rosera presented which persuaded the Court to tacitly conclude that an appeal is a 
chose in action. Those arguments are equally applicable here: 
The right to appeal an adverse decision is a chose in action. See RMA Ventures 
California, supra ("The property noticed for public sale, however, was Plaintiffs 
right to the chose in action (i.e., the legal claims) against Defendants in the instant 
case, including Plaintiffs right to appeal the district court's grant of summary 
judgment") (emphasis added); See also Department of Transportation v. Foster, 
et al., 262 Ga.App. 524, 525, 586 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The right to 
appeal the condemnor' s estimate of just and adequate compensation is a chose in 
action"); See also Ridgeway v. Jones, 122 Miss. 624, 84 So. 692 (1920) ("The 
right conferred ... on the assignee of any interest in a chose in action to begin and 
prosecute any suit or action in the name of the assignor includes the right to 
appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment in an action begun and prosecuted 
in the assignor's name"). Consistent with the foregoing authorities, Smith's right 
to appeal is included within the ambit of a chose in action. As such, if Smith only 
has a right to appeal, he still has a chose in action which may be levied upon 
pursuant to I. C. § 11-301. 
See Objection to Ex Parte Motion for Order Temporarily Staying Sheriffs Sale and Motion for 
Order Quashing Notice of Levy, P. 16-17. 
Smith fails to recognize the effect his appeal has on the issue of whether or not he 
still possesses a chose in action. By appealing the decision of this Court, Smith 
has essentially revived his cause of action and brought it before a higher tribunal 
for adjudication. If Smith indeed had no cause of action against the Defendants, 
an appeal would not be possible since the matter would be non-justiciable, there 
being no case or controversy. In accordance with the foregoing, Smith should 
perhaps tread more carefully in declaring that he is without a cause of action. In 
any event, the fact that this Court's decision is being reviewed indicates that 
Smith has a cause of action. As Smith does have a cause of action, I.C. § 11-301 
dictates that it may by the sheriff to satisfy Rosern's money judgment 
... Smith's position is inconsistent with the rulings in Applied 1\1edical and RMA 
Ventures California. In Rl'viA Ventures, Sun America levied on Ventures' 
right to an adverse decision of the lower court. See 
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F.3d at 1072. The 10th Circuit analyzed the entire case under the assumption that 
the right to appeal was a chose in action and was therefore subject to levy. In 
fact, it would have been impossible for the Court to reach a decision if it was not 
implicitly determined that the right to appeal is a chose in action. As such, RMA 
Ventures stands, in part, for the rule that an appeal is a chose in action; because an 
appeal is a chose in action and a chose in action may be levied upon, it follows by 
logic that an appeal may likewise be levied upon to satisfy a judgment. 
See Response to Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum, P. 8-9. Although the Court in Corlett issued its 
decision without giving stated reasons, the relief granted by the Supreme Court in that case 
implies beyond question that it agreed that an appeal is a chose in action that may be levied upon 
to satisfy a money judgment. 
It should also be noted that I.C. § 11-301 is not limited only to choses and/or things in 
action. Rather, the statute is broadly drafted and commands that a sheriff levy on choses in 
action, in addition to selling "other property." When read in coajunction with Idaho's additional 
levy and execution provisions, which frequently make mention of different permutations of 
property, finding that an appeal may be levied upon is an easy conclusion to reach. See e.g. J.C. 
§ 11-201 (Governing property that is subject to execution "All goods, chattels, moneys and 
other property, both.real and personal ... [and] [A]ll other property both real and personal, or 
any interest in either real or personal property, and all other property not capable of manual 
delivery, may be attached on execution in like manner as upon writs of attachment") 
(emphasis added); See also LC. § 8-506 (Governing the procedural requirements and order of 
execution "The sheriff ... must execute the same without delay ... as follows: ... 5. Debts and 
credits and 
Thus, even if 
not 
not of ( emphasis added). 
is correct in that an appeal is not a chose in action, an appeal is still personal 
+' 01 to 
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In light of the rulings in Corlett, supra, RMA Ventures California v. Sun America Life 
Insurance Company, 576 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2009), Applied Medical Technologies v. Eames, 
44 P.3d 699, 701-702 (Utah, 2002) (cited in KeyBank's prior memorandum), and the expansive 
manner in which Idaho's levy and execution provisions are drafted, an appeal and/or a right to 
appeal, is a chose in action and may be levied upon to satisfy a judgment. 
In addition, it cannot be emphasized enough that this entire scenario could be avoided if 
PAL simply posted a bond as it is required to do if PAL seeks to stay KeyBank's execution 
efforts. IAR 13(b )(15). Accordingly, relief for PAL is readily available. It has simply chosen 
to not avail itself of a rather easily obtainable remedy. 
2.) PAL's Motion to Consolidate should be denied because the District Court does not 
have jurisdiction to consolidate this matter and the facts herein do not wanant 
consolidation. 
(a) Jurisdiction 
IAR 13 (b) delineates the jurisdiction of a trial comi upon the filing of a notice of appeal. 
IAR 13 (b) states: 
In civil actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the district court 
shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following motions and to take 
the following actions during the pendency of an appeal. 
IAR I3(b) (emphasis added). 
The fact that the Idaho Appellate Rules specifically delineate what lower courts have the 
power to do is significant in light of the rule of statutory construction expresio unius est exclusio 
alterius. See Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 146 P.3d 664 
(2006) ( emphasis a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the 
designation of such things excludes all others"); See also Ohendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 
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statutes and to court rules). Consistent with the above, it follows that trial courts do not have the 
power to engage in actions not specifically expressed in IAR 13(b ). See also DesFosses v. 
DesFosses, 120 Idaho 27, 813 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1991) (Noting that during the pendency of the 
appeal, the District Court's jurisdiction is limited to the extent set out in subdivision (b) of IAR 
13). 
In the present case, PAL's Motion to Consolidate must be denied. IAR 13(b) does not 
state that lower courts have the authority to consolidate actions. As such, it follows by 
application of the foregoing rules of construction that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consolidate. 
Notably, such a finding makes sense from a practical standpoint as an appeal of a substantive 
decision brings the case under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and out of the jurisdiction of 
the trial court, with limited exceptions. If a lower court could consolidate a case that has been 
appealed with another pending action, the trial court's jurisdiction would trump that of the 
Supreme Court. Such a result is not appropriate as a matter of policy and, in omitting 
consolidation as an item on which the trial court could exercise its power and authority, 
avoidance of such a scenario appears to have been the mindful intent of the drafters. As such, 
consolidation is not warranted. 
(b) Substantive Merits of Consolidation 
Consolidation is addressed in IRCP 42(a). It states: 
Consolidation of - Consolidation. When actions involving a 
common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint 
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the 
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein 
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
IRCP 42(a). 
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In the present case, a plain language application ofIRCP 42(a) mandates denial of PAL's 
Motion to Consolidate. The verbiage employed by the drafters requires as a condition precedent 
to consolidation that the action be "pending before the court." Then, and only then, may the 
Court order such further relief as is contained in the rule itself. Significantly, this case has been 
litigated to a judgment and appealed. As such, the matter is no longer "pending before the 
Court." IRCP 42(a) (emphasis added). As this is the case, a condition precedent to 
consolidation has not - and cannot - occur. Thus, PAL's Motion to Consolidate must be 
denied. 1 
3.) Pal's Motion to Set Aside Judgment should be denied because there is no newly 
discovered evidence in the record and a money judgment has no prospective 
application. 
Pal asserts that the Court's Judgment should be set aside pursuant to subsections (2), (5), 
and ( 6) of IRCP 60(b ). IRCP 60(b) states, in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons ... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59 ... (5) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. 
IRCP 60(b). 
Each of PAL' s grounds will be addressed in turn. 
(a) Newly Discovered Evidence 
To be entitled to relief under IRCP 60(b )(2), a litigant must provide the Court with 
hos to I11CZ1l1 
1 Though not as persuasive an argument, it is worth mentioning that the caption of the rule itself indicates that it is 
i:. •• :,.J •· ·'-- ••..•• i:J-•'-·· ·'"···'· 1 - -·· ·--····'-····'-we reached a final resolution and are now up for appeal. 
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existence at the time of trial but not discoverable with due diligence." Savage Lateral Ditch 
Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 245, 869 P.2d 554, 562 (1993) (emphasis added). As 
stated by our Supreme Court in Doe: "[F]acts which occur subsequent to trial are not considered 
newly discovered evidence." Doe, 145 Idaho at 652, 182 P.3d at 709. 
In the present case, PAL's Motion to Set Aside must be denied. First, PAL has failed to 
disclose any "newly discovered evidence." The only evidence provided relates to events which 
occurred subsequent to entry of judgment. See Brief in Support of PAL's Motions and in 
Opposition to KeyBank's Motion Contesting PAL I, LLC's Claim of Exemption, P. 3 ("PAL 
could not have discovered this evidence any sooner because the court entered judgment to 
KeyBank in January of 2011, and Zion's did not file suit until May 18, 2011") (emphasis 
added). Facts which occur subsequent to entry of judgment and/or trial do not constitute "newly 
discovered evidence." Because the only evidence PAL has presented occurred after judgment, 
PAL has failed to present sufficient evidence for this Court to find that its judgment should be set 
aside lmder IRCP 60(b )(2). 
Second, by its own admission, PAL is using Rule 60(b) to re-litigate its substantive 
claims in lieu of appealing the matter and posting the appropriate bond. See Brief in Support of 
PAL's Motions and in Opposition to KeyBank's Motion Contesting PAL I, LLC's Claim of 
Exemption, P. 3 (Inviting the Court to "revisit the correctness of the court's determination that 
KeyBank did not have to comply with Idaho Code Section 11-203"). As enunciated by the 
Supreme Court, such conduct is explicitly impermissible. Doe, 145 Idaho at 651, 182 P.3d at 
708 ("A 60(b) motion is not a substitute for an appeal"). 
smce evt:n · casG \Vas filed that Zion's a 
security interest in some of the proceeds which \Vere sold. Beginning with the fact that Zion's 
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filed UCC is public record and continuing with the fact that Zion's counsel was in 
communication with counsel for PAL and counsel for KeyBank at all stages of the proceedings 
in this litigation. PAL could have easily sought to join Zion's as a party (or initiated a second 
action against Zions and sought to consolidate the two cases) and thereby long ago raised its 
concerns about potential double liability. PAL chose not to do so and instead made its stand 
solely upon the basis that PAL's own judicial execution sale trumps KeyBank's security interest. 
Having failed to raise the issue with respect to Zion's previously ( despite having knowledge of 
that issue) and instead having elected to rest its case upon one slender reed, it is now too late for 
PAL to cry "foul" and introduce alternative arguments to those it previously lost. 
In light of the foregoing, PAL's Motion to Set Aside should be denied. PAL has 
presented no newly discovered evidence and is impermissibly using IRCP to re-litigate the 
Court's prior decision. 
(b) Equities of Prospective Application 
A party may be relieved from a judgment under IRCP 60(b )(5) if "it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." IRCP 60(b )(5). "To rely on 
Rule 60(b)(5), a movant must show two things: (1) that the judgment is prospective in nature; 
and (2) that it is no longer equitable to enforce the judgment as written." Rudd v. Rudd, l 05 
Idaho 112,118,666 P.2d 639,645 (1983). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a money judgment is not prospective in nature 
and therefore may not be modified or set aside under IRCP 60(b)(5). See Hansen v. Myers, 148 
Idaho 283, 290, 221 P.3d 81, 88 (2009) (Ruling that a compensatory damage award is not a 
prospective judgment); See also Curl v. Curl, 115 Idaho 997, 1002, 772 P.2d 204, 209 (1989) 
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(Holding that a divorce decree was not prospective because it had "adjudicated all the rights as 
between the parties as of the date of the judgment") ( emphasis added). 
The Hansen decision is consistent with the overwhelming majority rule that a money 
judgment is not prospective in nature and therefore, does not fall under the scope of Rule 
60(b)(5). See e.g. Deweerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("In practical 
terms, these standards mean that judgments involving injunctions have 'prospective 
application,' while money judgments do not"); See also Stokers v. Morrison, 147 F.3d 759, 762 
(81h Cir. 1998) ("[A] money judgment does not have prospective application, and ... relief from a 
final money judgment is therefore not available under the equitable leg of Rule 60(b )( 5)"); See 
also Lindy Investments, !IL L.P. v. Shakertown Corp., 631 F.Supp.2d 815, 819 (E.D.La., 2008) 
("It is beyond dispute that a money judgment does not have prospective application for purposes 
of Rule 60(b )(5)"); See also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 840 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir. 1988) 
("The judgment is for money, and thus has no prospective operation"); See also First Nat. Bank 
in Belleville v. Sankey Motors, Inc., 41 Kan.App.2d 629, 637, 204 P.3d 1167 (2009) 
("[N]umerous federal cases ... have recognized that money judgments do not have prospective 
application and do not come within Rule 60(b)(5)"). 
In the present case, PAL's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment must be denied. 
KeyBank has simply recovered a money judgment against PAL. Under Hansen, Curl, and the 
majority rule in the United States, a bare money judgment does not have prospective application. 
Furthermore, the application of equitable principles typically involves a determination of 
whether the party seeking equity is without an adequate legal remedy. PAL's right to post a 
supercedeas bond under the LA.R. is exactly just a legal remedy. simply wants to 
skirt this legal requirement and cry "equity" to a bond. This is not equitable 
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sort of relief contemplated under IRCP 60(b )( 5). Therefore, the judgment recovered by 
KeyBank does not fall within the scope of IRCP 60(b)(5). Accordingly, PAL is not entitled to 
relief thereunder. 
( c) Any Other Reasons Justifying Relief 
PAL presents no argument in favor of this subsection of this subsection of IRCP 60(b ). 
Accordingly, no formal response is warranted. KeyBank will note, however, that our Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is only warranted if 
"extraordinary circumstances" exist. See Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1995). 
This is significant as the Idaho Supreme Court regularly defers to federal jurisprudence for 
guidance in interpreting Idaho's own rules of civil procedure. See e.g. Sammis v. Magnetek, 
Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 347, 941 P.2d 314, 319 (1997); See also Cambell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 
646, 115 P.3d 731, 737 (2005). PAL has not pointed to any extraordinary circumstances that 
would warrant relief under IRCP 60(b)(6) and none exist in the record. Accordingly, relief 
under IRCP 60(b )( 6) must also be denied. 
4.) PAL's Motion to Discharge Attachment should be denied because PAL cured any 
alleged irregularity by filing a claim of exemption and I.C. § 8-534 and IRCP 5 have 
no application to the facts of this case. 
PAL claims that Key Bank's attachment should be discharged. PAL reasons that because 
KeyBank apparently did not serve a claim of exemption on PAL, this rendered service 
"irregular" and therefore, subject to discharge. This position relies on the content of IRCP 5(a) 
and I.C. § 8-534. PAL's arguments lack merit. For one, PAL fifod a claim 
m matter. In addition, the letter to sheriff specifically instructed the sheriff to 
personally serve with all necessary exemption forms. As such, any error in service was not 
committed bv fact in the accompanying f 0~ Keith 
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Christensen, he states that claim of exemption forms were actually served on the registered agent 
for PAL. Under Idaho Code Section 8-507 A, the statute provides: 
§ 8-507. Garnishment--Service of writ of attachment, execution, or 
garnishment--Banks 
(a) Upon receiving written directions from the plaintiff or his attorney, that any 
person or corporation, public or private, has in his or its possession or control, any 
credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, or is owing any debt 
to the defendant, the sheriff shall serve upon any such person, or corporation 
identified in the plaintiffs written directions all of the following documents: 
(1) a copy of the writ; 
(2) a notice that such credits, or other property, or debts, as the case may be, are 
attached in pursuance of such writ; 
(3) a notice of exemptions available under federal and state law; 
( 4) instructions to debtors and third parties for asserting a claim of exemption; 
(5) a form for making a claim of exemption; and 
( 6) if the garnishee is a bank or depository institution, a search fee of five dollars 
($5.00) and the last known mailing address of the defendant and, if known, a tax 
identification number, that will enable the garnishee to identify the defendant on 
its records. 
The documents specified in paragraphs (3) through (5) of this subsection shall be 
in a form substantially similar to the form provided in section 8-507C, Idaho 
Code. 
The form that is attached to the deputy sheriffs affidavit is substantially similar to the form 
prescribed by 8-507C. What matters is that the fom1 was served on the registered agent for PAL 
in person. Merely because a copy was not sent by the Sheriff to the attorney for PAL makes no 
substantive difference to the effective service. 
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In any event, PAL should not be able to discharge the attachment on the basis that it 
allegedly did not receive a claim of exemption when PAL actually filed a claim of exemption. 
Moreover, PAL's reliance on and interpretation of LC. § 8-534 and IRCP 5 is unavailing. 
(a) I.C. § 8-534 
LC. § 8-534 states: 
The defendant may also at any time, either before or after the release of the 
attached property, or before any attachment shall have been actually levied, apply 
on motion upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, to the court in which the action 
is brought, or to the judge thereof, that the writ of attachment be discharged on the 
ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued. 
LC. § 8-534. 
Case law interpreting LC. § 8-534 has expressly stated that "any objection [under LC. 
§ 8-534] to the irregularities of an attachment proceeding must be made before the entry of 
judgment." McLuskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472,475, 511 P.2d 289, 292 (1973). In McLuskey 
v. Galland, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that no error could be assigned to the trial court for 
denying a motion to discharge where the motion was made after judgment was entered. In the 
instant matter, PALI is challenging the validity of an "attachment" after the Court issued 
judgment in favor of Key Bank. McLuskey controls and mandates that PAL has waived any relief 
under I.C. § 8-534. 
It should also be noted that the ruling in McLuskey is instrnctive regarding the limited 
scope of LC. § 8-534, in particular. It would be impossible for the law in this state to be that I.C. 
§ 8-534 applies to prejudgment attachment as well as post judgment levy and execution, but that 
a party waives the ability to challenge an improper attachment if the challenge is made after 
entry of judgment. interpretation of LC. § 8-534 is thus unduly expansive and not in 
accord with intent of the As such, PAL's Motion to Discharge must be 
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(b) IRCP 5 
IRCP states: 
) 
Every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the 
original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of 
record on appeal, brief and memorandum of law, and similar paper shall be 
served upon each of the parties affected thereby. 
IRCP 5 (emphasis added). 
By its clear terms, IRCP 5(a) has no application to the facts in the instant matter. The 
claim of exemption that PAL seeks is not a pleading (See IRCP 7 ( a) ("There shall be a complaint 
and an answer ... a reply to a counterclaim ... an answer to a cross-claim ... [ and] a third-party 
complaint ... No other pleading shall be allowed") (emphasis added), a motion, a notice, an 
appearance, a demand, an order of judgment, a brief or a "similar paper." As such, IRCP 5(a) 
does not provide any basis for the relief sought by PAL. 
As a final matter, it should be noted that a chose in action is not exempt property. Even 
assuming KeyBank's actions were improper and further assuming that PAL was in fact prejudicd 
such that it had not filed a timely claim of exemption (which is not the case by any means), still 
PAL has no valid claim of exemption. Even the most cursory analysis of I.C. §§ 6-603-605 
indicates that an appeal is not exempt from levy and execution. As is sometimes said of "quasi-
cstoppel," PAL's argument for discharge appears to be a "last-gasp theory." Thomas v. Arkoosh 
Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002). 
In light of the foregoing analysis, Key Bank respectfully requests that Court GRANT 
KcyBank's Motion Contesting PAL I, LLC's Claim of Exemption, P1'\L's Motion to 
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Consolidate, DENY PAL's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, DENY PAL's Motion to Discharge 
Attachment, and award KeyBank its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. § 12-
120(5). 
DATED this ?Y-aay of July, 2011. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
· nder P. McLaughlin 
Attorneys for KeyBank National Ass'n 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /~day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served on the following by the manner indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B.J. Driscoll 
Smith Driscoll & Associates, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 5073i 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
~ia U.S. Mail 
D Via Hand-Delivery 
D Via Overnight Delivery 
D Via Facsimile 208-529-4166 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF KEYBANK'S MOTION CONTESTING PAL I, LLC'S 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND RESPOi~SE IN OPPOSITION TOP/IL!, LLC'S 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISCHARGE ATIACHMENT 
NTESTTNG PAL l, LLC'S CLA1Ivf OF EXEMPT!O,\J 
; MOTfON TO CO'.\SOLJDATE, MOTION TO SET 
. XfTACH\1El·,lT - 16 
PAGE 70 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
) 















BRIAN CHRISTENSEN an individual; LA ) 
PARKINSON, an individual; BARNEY ) 
DAIRY, INC.; DJ BARNEY, an individual ) 
WILLIAM DA VIS, an individual; LOIS ) 
DA VIS, an individual; and DELL RAY ) 
BARNEY, an individual; DELL J BARNEY) 
an individual, dba Barney Towing & ) 
Recovery ) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CASE NO. CV-2010-680 
SUPREME CT NO. 38645-2011 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Bryan D Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
Thomas E Dvorak 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
